Universos éticos y la metarregla del doble efecto en el estado de necesidad

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dc.coverageDOI: 10.22201/IIJ.24487937E.2020.14.14911
dc.creatorGuerra, Rodrigo
dc.creatorMadrid, Raul
dc.date2020
dc.date.accessioned2025-11-18T19:53:26Z
dc.date.available2025-11-18T19:53:26Z
dc.descriptionThis article aims to explain when the distinction between a greater or lesser evil responds to a consequentialist ethical universe or not under necessity defense. In addition, explain why the human life pondering is possible from the double effect principle, accepting the objectification of its parameters according to an action. Therefore, in the first section we deal with the concept of evil in a consequentialist and moral absolutist perspective. On the second section of this article, we explain the importance of these ethical universes in the evils pondering. Then, we contrast our reasoning with the solution proposed by the double effect doctrine under necessity cases. Finally, in the third section, we give a criminal policy criterion to understand the deontic demands under necessity. © 2020 Problema. All rights reserved.spa
dc.identifierhttps://investigadores.uandes.cl/en/publications/00162662-fc03-4708-98bb-8ef7b3558441
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uandes.cl/handle/uandes/58251
dc.languagespa
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source(2020) nr.14 p.247-283
dc.subjectDoble efecto
dc.subjectEstado de necesidad
dc.subjectConsecuencialismo
dc.subjectAbsolutismo moral
dc.subjectUniversos éticos
dc.titleUniversos éticos y la metarregla del doble efecto en el estado de necesidadspa
dc.titleEthical universes and the meta-rule of double effect in state of necessityspa
dc.typeArticleeng
dc.typeArtículospa
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