Grotius’s Via Media

dc.coverageDOI: 10.1163/18760759-44020006
dc.creatorAguirre, Sebastián Contreras
dc.date2023
dc.date.accessioned05-01-2026 18:07
dc.date.available05-01-2026 18:07
dc.description<p>Grotius’s theory of the foundations of law and morality follows a sort of middle way between rationalism and voluntarism. Grotius, far from both extremes, defends both the normative force of the will and the directive power of practical reason. On this basis, he explains that reason serves as the formal cause of law and the will as the efflcient cause. Now, the command of the will alone is not yet valid as a law. It must conform to reason. Reasoning so, Grotius places himself within the scholastic-Aristotelian tradition. Accordingly, he holds the primacy of reason over the will and defends the eminently practical, i.e., non-mathematical, character of morality and law.</p>eng
dc.descriptionGrotius’s theory of the foundations of law and morality follows a sort of middle way between rationalism and voluntarism. Grotius, far from both extremes, defends both the normative force of the will and the directive power of practical reason. On this basis, he explains that reason serves as the formal cause of law and the will as the efflcient cause. Now, the command of the will alone is not yet valid as a law. It must conform to reason. Reasoning so, Grotius places himself within the scholastic-Aristotelian tradition. Accordingly, he holds the primacy of reason over the will and defends the eminently practical, i.e., non-mathematical, character of morality and law.spa
dc.identifierhttps://investigadores.uandes.cl/en/publications/3c8058b8-8f20-4e70-a46c-222970f69ceb
dc.languageeng
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.sourcevol.44 (2023) nr.2 p.366-389
dc.subjectHugo Grotius
dc.subjectlaw
dc.subjectmorality
dc.subjectpractical reason
dc.subjectrationalism
dc.subjectvoluntarism
dc.titleGrotius’s Via Mediaeng
dc.typeArticleeng
dc.typeArtículospa
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