Análisis crítico de los mecanismos de designación del Tribunal Constitucional y el Consejo General del Poder Judicial en España
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Universidad de los Andes
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Conferir legitimidad democrática indirecta a unos órganos que, como es el caso del Tribunal Constitucional y el Consejo General del Poder Judicial se definen como contramayoritarios, se afirma como pretensión principal de la normativa que los regula. Movido por tal objetivo, el marco regulador relativo a la designación parlamentaria de los referidos órganos de relevancia constitucional gira en torno a tres elementos fundamentales: por una parte, recabar el apoyo cualificado de los grupos políticos con representación en las asambleas legislativas. Por otra, seleccionar a los candidatos con una mejor cualificación técnica y una más destacada trayectoria profesional. Asimismo, como tercer eje articulador, la duración de los mandatos se desvincula del de la legislatura parlamentaria, superándola en extensión. De este modo, el período de mandato queda al margen de los ciclos electorales. El estudio del caso español arroja un diagnóstico problemático, puesto que la aplicación de las previsiones jurídicas establecidas no se ajusta a sus pautas inspiradoras. La realidad es que, sobre todo en la fase temporal más reciente, se ha instalado un contexto de índole patológica, en el que las disposiciones vigentes experimentan una profunda adulteración de su sentido. La prevalencia de un sistema partidista de cuotas en la designación de los candidatos llamados a ocupar los cargos en liza, aceptados recíprocamente por los actores políticos responsables, limita sustancialmente los efectos de la intervención parlamentaria en los procesos selectivos. De hecho, esta queda relegada a un terreno esencialmente formal, configurándose como un mero trámite. En una línea similar de alteración de su finalidad constitucional, la duración de los mandatos no se cumple, sin que se produzca la renovación en el tiempo establecido, lo que trae consigo un escenario recurrente de prórrogas generalizadas. Ante tal estado de cosas, se impone una seria reflexión que ayude a recuperar la voluntad rectora de las normas constitucionales. Invertir los términos de la arraigada patología que caracteriza el sistema español en el terreno estudiado, sin embargo, exigiría la transformación radical del modus operandi asumido por los partidos políticos. Conscientes de la dificultad de la tarea propuesta y tomando como referente los reglamentos parlamentarios, formulamos una serie de propuestas de reforma cuya puesta en marcha contribuiría a reconducir el negativo panorama institucional concurrente.
To confer indirect democratic legitimacy on bodies like Constitutional Court and General Council of the Judiciary, that are defined as counter-majoritarian is the main aim of the regulations that govern them. With this objective in mind, the regulatory framework for the parliamentary appointment of constitutionally relevant bodies revolves around three fundamental elements: on the one hand, to obtain the qualified support of the political groups represented in the legislative assemblies. On the other hand, the selection of candidates with the best technical qualifications and the most outstanding professional track record. Likewise, as a third axis, the duration of the terms of office is separated from that of the parliamentary legislature, exceeding it in length. In this way, the term of office is not linked to electoral cycles. The study of the Spanish case reveals a problematic diagnosis, since the application of the established legal provisions does not conform to the guidelines that inspire them. The reality is that, especially in the most recent temporary phase, a context of a pathological nature has prevailed, in which the provisions in force have undergone a profound adulteration of their meaning. The prevalence of a partisan system of quotas in the nomination of candidates for the posts in question, reciprocally accepted by the responsible political actors, substantially limits the effects of parliamentary intervention in the selection processes. In fact, the latter is relegated to an essentially formal field, being configured as a mere formality. Along a similar line of alteration of its constitutional purpose, the duration of mandates is not complied with, without renewal within the established time, which results in a recurrent scenario of generalised extensions. Faced with such a state of affairs, serious reflection is needed to help recover the guiding will of constitutional norms. Reversing the terms of the deep-rooted pathology that characterises the Spanish system in the field under study, however, would require a radical transformation of the modus operandi assumed by the political parties. Aware of the difficulty of the proposed task and taking parliamentary regulations as a reference point, we formulate a series of reform proposals whose implementation would contribute to redressing the negative institutional context.
To confer indirect democratic legitimacy on bodies like Constitutional Court and General Council of the Judiciary, that are defined as counter-majoritarian is the main aim of the regulations that govern them. With this objective in mind, the regulatory framework for the parliamentary appointment of constitutionally relevant bodies revolves around three fundamental elements: on the one hand, to obtain the qualified support of the political groups represented in the legislative assemblies. On the other hand, the selection of candidates with the best technical qualifications and the most outstanding professional track record. Likewise, as a third axis, the duration of the terms of office is separated from that of the parliamentary legislature, exceeding it in length. In this way, the term of office is not linked to electoral cycles. The study of the Spanish case reveals a problematic diagnosis, since the application of the established legal provisions does not conform to the guidelines that inspire them. The reality is that, especially in the most recent temporary phase, a context of a pathological nature has prevailed, in which the provisions in force have undergone a profound adulteration of their meaning. The prevalence of a partisan system of quotas in the nomination of candidates for the posts in question, reciprocally accepted by the responsible political actors, substantially limits the effects of parliamentary intervention in the selection processes. In fact, the latter is relegated to an essentially formal field, being configured as a mere formality. Along a similar line of alteration of its constitutional purpose, the duration of mandates is not complied with, without renewal within the established time, which results in a recurrent scenario of generalised extensions. Faced with such a state of affairs, serious reflection is needed to help recover the guiding will of constitutional norms. Reversing the terms of the deep-rooted pathology that characterises the Spanish system in the field under study, however, would require a radical transformation of the modus operandi assumed by the political parties. Aware of the difficulty of the proposed task and taking parliamentary regulations as a reference point, we formulate a series of reform proposals whose implementation would contribute to redressing the negative institutional context.
Keywords
Constitutional Court (CC), General Council of the Judiciary (GCJ), reinforced majorities, extended mandate, selection and appointment commissions, public hearing, partisan quota system, institutional blockage, veto power, Tribunal Constitucional (TC), Consejo General del Poder Judicial (CGPJ), mayorías reforzadas, mandato prorrogado, comisiones de selección y designación, audiencia pública, sistema de cuotas partidistas, bloqueo institucional, facultad de veto