Robust predictions in dynamic policy games

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dc.coverageDOI: 10.3982/TE4489
dc.creatorPassadore, Juan
dc.creatorXandri, Juan Pablo
dc.date2024
dc.date.accessioned05-01-2026 18:07
dc.date.available05-01-2026 18:07
dc.description<p>Dynamic policy games feature a wide range of equilibria. This paper provides a methodology for obtaining robust predictions. We focus on a model of sovereign debt, although our methodology applies to other settings, such as models of monetary policy or capital taxation. Our main result is a characterization of distributions over outcomes that are consistent with a subgame perfect equilibrium conditional on the observed history. We illustrate our main result by computing—conditional on an observed history—bounds across all equilibria on the maximum probability of a crisis: means, variances, and covariances over debt prices.</p>eng
dc.identifierhttps://investigadores.uandes.cl/en/publications/95ef87dd-e78d-4f88-8481-965501858bd3
dc.languageeng
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.sourcevol.19 (2024) nr.4 p.1659-1700
dc.subjectC73
dc.subjectMultiple equilibria
dc.subjectcorrelated equilibrium
dc.subjectmoment inequalities
dc.subjectpolicy games
dc.subjectrobustness
dc.titleRobust predictions in dynamic policy gameseng
dc.typeArticleeng
dc.typeArtículospa
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