Dynamiccoordination withtimingfrictions: Theoryandapplications

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dc.creatorPereira, Ana
dc.date2024
dc.date.accessioned2026-03-12T13:15:00Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-03-12T16:28:44Z
dc.date.available2026-03-12T13:15:00Z
dc.date.available2026-03-12T16:28:44Z
dc.description.abstractWe present a general framework of dynamic coordination with timing frictions. A continuum of agents receive random chances to choose between two actions and remain locked in the selected action until their next opportunity to reoptimize. The instantaneous utility from each action depends on an exogenous fundamental that moves stochastically and on the mass of agents currently playing each action. Agents' decisions are strategic complements and history matters. We review some key theoretical results and show a general method to solve the social planner's problem. We then review applications of this framework to different economic problems: network externalities, statistical discrimination, and business cycles. The positive implications of these models are very similar, but the social planner's solution points to very different results for efficiency in each case. Last, we review extensions of the framework that allow for endogenous hazard rates and ex ante heterogeneous agents.spa
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12427
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uandes.cl/handle/uandes/1110006
dc.languagespa
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.subjectInteligencia artificial generativa
dc.subjectUTAUT2
dc.subjectAceptación tecnológica
dc.titleDynamiccoordination withtimingfrictions: Theoryandapplicationsen
dc.typeArticle
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