The causality of moral actions: Richard Taylor and Thomas Reid

dc.coverageDOI: 10.4067/S0718-92732023000100061
dc.creatorElton, María
dc.date2023
dc.date.accessioned05-01-2026 18:13
dc.date.available05-01-2026 18:13
dc.description<p>The theory according to which human actions are events caused by other events depending on laws of nature, inspired on the thought of David Hume, has predominated in contemporary philosophy of action. Some have opposed this approach, proposing that the ultimate cause of human actions is the agent. Prominent among them has been Richard Taylor, who was inspired by Thomas Reid, a Scottish Enlightenment philosopher contemporary of Hume, whose notion of moral agency is of special historical importance, despite being implicit in ancient and medieval philosophy, because it sharply distinguishes the notion of agency from the notion of event as the cause of moral actions. Such a contraposition opens up another discussion: in what does the agent's activity consist in? Both Reid, in the Enlightenment, and Taylor, in contemporary philosophy, answer this question from experience, without relying on old metaphysical schemes. However, Reid discovers, by experiential induction, that the will is an efficient metaphysical cause, so he can complete Taylor's approach, who avoids speaking of causes of actions because of its contemporary connotation, saying that the beginning of actions would be only in reasons and purposes.</p>eng
dc.identifierhttps://investigadores.uandes.cl/en/publications/f81aa70c-c907-4bc4-a5a1-7216efa9f76c
dc.languagespa
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source(2023) nr.54 p.61-75
dc.subjectagent
dc.subjectefficiency
dc.subjectevent
dc.subjectreason
dc.subjectvolition
dc.subjectagent
dc.subjectevent
dc.subjectreason
dc.subjectvolition
dc.subjectefficiency
dc.titleThe causality of moral actions: Richard Taylor and Thomas Reideng
dc.titleLa causalidad de las acciones morales: Richard Taylor y Thomas Reidspa
dc.typeArticleeng
dc.typeArtículospa
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