Information exchange through secret vertical contracts

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dc.coverageDOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01539-4
dc.creatorDo, Jihwan
dc.creatorRiquelme, Nicolás
dc.date2024
dc.date.accessioned05-01-2026 18:14
dc.date.available05-01-2026 18:14
dc.description<p>We study a common agency problem in which two downstream firms, who are local monopolists and receive private demand signals, offer secret menus of two-part tariff contracts to their common supplier. While direct communication is not possible, they may still exchange their information through signal-contingent menus of vertical contracts. We show that a perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists in which information is transmitted, and downstream firms obtain nearly the first-best industry surplus. The use of both fixed charges and slotting fees is necessary for such a result. Our analysis provides a novel explanation for the use of slotting fees in vertical contracting based on its value as an information transmission device.</p>eng
dc.identifierhttps://investigadores.uandes.cl/en/publications/5c129c42-ce3b-40c8-8960-06b5396e9794
dc.languageeng
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.sourcevol.78 (2024) nr.3 p.671-707
dc.subjectAntitrust
dc.subjectChannel of distribution
dc.subjectCommon agency
dc.subjectInformation exchange
dc.subjectRetailer-manufacturer relation
dc.subjectVertical contracting
dc.titleInformation exchange through secret vertical contractseng
dc.typeArticleeng
dc.typeArtículospa
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