Rollover risk and stress test credibility

Simple item page
dc.coverageDOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.006
dc.creatorPereira, Ana Elisa
dc.date2021
dc.date.accessioned2026-01-05T21:12:11Z
dc.date.available2026-01-05T21:12:11Z
dc.description<p>This paper studies information disclosure when financial supervisors cannot commit to communicate truthfully. A regulator performs a stress test and chooses whether to disclose bank-specific or aggregate results. Results can be biased at a cost (the higher this cost, the more credible the regulator). Manipulating aggregate information may avoid bank failures, but only if credibility is high enough. Supervisors with little credibility cannot prevent systemic runs by misreporting aggregate information and must release bank-specific reports (truthful or not), triggering partial runs. The results have implications for institutional design: ex ante, a social planner would choose an interior level of credibility.</p>eng
dc.identifierhttps://investigadores.uandes.cl/en/publications/ad834624-77c4-4b2e-9923-1c92a0449c4e
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uandes.cl/handle/uandes/65132
dc.languageeng
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.sourcevol.129 (2021) date: 2021-09-01 p.370-399
dc.subjectBank runs
dc.subjectInformation disclosure
dc.subjectInformation manipulation
dc.subjectStrategic complementarities
dc.titleRollover risk and stress test credibilityeng
dc.typeArticleeng
dc.typeArtículospa
Files
Collections
Pure-CRIS