Embrace the exception. The prudence of the judge as a point of connection between Schmittian and Aristotelic ideas

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dc.coverageDOI: 10.6018/DAIMON.373451
dc.creatorGarcía-Huidobro, Joaquín
dc.creatorPérez Lasserre, Diego
dc.date2021
dc.date.accessioned05-01-2026 18:19
dc.date.available05-01-2026 18:19
dc.description<p>This work aims to justify that, although it is true that there are differences between Aristotelian and Schmittian philosophy, there is a point of connection between both in what refers to prudence. In particular, we intend to demonstrate that in Schmitt’s description of the role of the judge in Law and Judgment (1912) and On the three types of juristic thought (1934) ideas of the practical philosophy of the Stagirite are present.</p>eng
dc.identifierhttps://investigadores.uandes.cl/en/publications/ebc329a6-d139-43fe-8b04-ec7a8d73da21
dc.languagespa
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source(2021) date: 2021-05-01 nr.83 p.185-199
dc.subjectAristotle
dc.subjectJudicial role
dc.subjectPrudence
dc.subjectSchmitt
dc.titleEmbrace the exception. The prudence of the judge as a point of connection between Schmittian and Aristotelic ideaseng
dc.titleAcoger la excepción. La prudencia del juez como punto de conexión entre las ideas schmittianas y aristotélicasspa
dc.typeArticleeng
dc.typeArtículospa
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