The relevance of the number of lives in cases of necessity

dc.coverageDOI: 10.4067/S0718-00122023000100109
dc.creatorMiranda Montecinos, Alejandro
dc.date2023
dc.date.accessioned05-01-2026 18:20
dc.date.available05-01-2026 18:20
dc.description<p>This paper critically analyzes, from a philosophical-legal perspective, the “principle of irrelevance of numbers”, that is, the thesis according to which in a case of necessity it is inadmissible to invoke as justification the weighting according to the number of human lives in conflict. The author tries to show that this principle, in itself, fails to withstand philosophical criticism, and must therefore be abandoned. With this aim, he proceeds as follows. First, the principle of irrelevance of numbers and the conclusions that have been tried to be drawn from it are explained. Second, he shows that these conclusions really confuse the issue of numbers with other morally relevant factors, which can explain them. Third, arguments are presented to prove that numbers are relevant even in the context of a non-consequentialist theory that recognizes the inviolability of the dignity of the person. Fourth, some objections against the relevance of numbers are examined. Finally, the problem of the relevance of numbers as a legal justification is explored.</p>eng
dc.identifierhttps://investigadores.uandes.cl/en/publications/d108cc64-7bf9-447f-8637-41bf36fc6e8e
dc.languagespa
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.sourcevol.29 (2023) nr.1 p.109-123
dc.subjectNumber of lives
dc.subjectnecessity
dc.subjectproportionality
dc.subjectNúmero de vidas
dc.subjectproporcionalidad
dc.subjectnecesidad
dc.titleThe relevance of the number of lives in cases of necessityeng
dc.titleLa relevancia del número de vidas en situaciones de necesidadspa
dc.typeArticleeng
dc.typeArtículospa
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