Adam Smith and relativism

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dc.coverageDOI: 10.15581/009.42.29210
dc.creatorCarrasco, María A.
dc.date2009
dc.date.accessioned05-01-2026 18:06
dc.date.available05-01-2026 18:06
dc.description<p>In this paper I will argue that Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments is not a relativistic ethics. Although many ethical norms are conventional, there are others, particularly those of justice, which are cross-cultural. Smith's view of justice, summarized in the imperative 'Do not harm our equals', contains two elements: on the one hand the term 'harm', which might be culture-relative; yet, on the other, the term 'equals', whose referent, although not always recognized, does not depend on different 'cultures' notions.</p>eng
dc.identifierhttps://investigadores.uandes.cl/en/publications/cc74658c-bb77-4b1e-aeac-613deb6683a3
dc.languagespa
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.sourcevol.42 (2009) nr.1 p.179-204
dc.subjectAdam Smith
dc.subjectEthics
dc.subjectRelativism
dc.subjectScottish enlightenment
dc.titleAdam Smith and relativismeng
dc.titleAdam Smith y el relativismospa
dc.typeReview articleeng
dc.typeArtículo de revisiónspa
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