The going public decision of business group firms

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dc.coverageDOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101819
dc.creatorLarrain, Borja
dc.creatorSertsios, Giorgo
dc.creatorFrancisco Urzúa, I.
dc.date2021
dc.date.accessioned05-01-2026 18:03
dc.date.available05-01-2026 18:03
dc.description<p>IPOs affiliated to business groups represent a large fraction of new issues in global markets. Groups are characterized by stronger private benefits of control and an internal funding advantage. Consistent with these features, group firms are more selective when going public than standalone firms. In particular, group IPOs are larger and older firms and engage less in market timing than standalone IPOs. Group firms invest less and are more profitable post IPO. Private benefits of control also affect the within-group selection of IPO firm. Our findings illustrate novel selection effects in public markets due to pre-IPO control structures.</p>eng
dc.identifierhttps://investigadores.uandes.cl/en/publications/d3be1d2d-47bc-4437-b3dc-06f963789978
dc.languageeng
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.sourcevol.66 (2021) date: 2021-02-01
dc.subjectBusiness groups
dc.subjectIPOs
dc.subjectPrivate benefits
dc.titleThe going public decision of business group firmseng
dc.typeArticleeng
dc.typeArtículospa
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