SMITHIAN MORAL JUDGEMENT: HUMEAN PASSIONS AND BEYOND
| dc.coverage | DOI: 10.3366/jsp.2023.0368 | |
| dc.creator | Carrasco, Maria A. | |
| dc.date | 2023 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 05-01-2026 18:06 | |
| dc.date.available | 05-01-2026 18:06 | |
| dc.description | <p>Smithian (supposedly) irregular feelings reveal the internal structure of moral judgements by showing that they consist of two distinct elements. These elements belong to different dynamisms of human nature, are triggered by different causes, and produce different reactions in the agent. In the case of resentment, I call them animal resentment and moral resentment, respectively. Animal resentment closely resembles Hume’s account of resentment and follows his theory of the passions. Moral resentment is different, for it is not caused directly by pain, but by the recognition of the evil intention of the aggressor. Finally, plain moral resentment – or resentment caused by an unjust action and approved of by the impartial spectator – blends these elements into a unity articulated by Hume’s theory of the passions.</p> | eng |
| dc.identifier | https://investigadores.uandes.cl/en/publications/70c9f795-7301-45e1-8d7b-829201cb0330 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess | |
| dc.source | vol.21 (2023) nr.3 p.275-292 | |
| dc.subject | Hume | |
| dc.subject | Smith | |
| dc.subject | moral judgment | |
| dc.subject | passions | |
| dc.title | SMITHIAN MORAL JUDGEMENT: HUMEAN PASSIONS AND BEYOND | eng |
| dc.type | Article | eng |
| dc.type | Artículo | spa |