Market Power Absent Merger Review: Brewing in Perú

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dc.coverageDOI: 10.1007/s11151-019-09703-8
dc.creatorCasarin, Ariel A.
dc.creatorCornejo, Magdalena
dc.creatorDelfino, María Eugenia
dc.date2020
dc.date.accessioned05-01-2026 18:04
dc.date.available05-01-2026 18:04
dc.description<p>We examine the extent of market power in the brewing market of Perú, where the absence of preventive merger review eased consolidation into a single industrial brewer. We use a standard oligopoly model and exploit both seasonality in demand and atypically large and frequent variations in the structure and level of excise taxes to identify variations in market power. Our results provide evidence of the ineffectiveness of competition policy as uncontested mergers resulted in a degree of market power that decreased only with the entry of new firms.</p>eng
dc.descriptionWe examine the extent of market power in the brewing market of Perú, where the absence of preventive merger review eased consolidation into a single industrial brewer. We use a standard oligopoly model and exploit both seasonality in demand and atypically large and frequent variations in the structure and level of excise taxes to identify variations in market power. Our results provide evidence of the ineffectiveness of competition policy as uncontested mergers resulted in a degree of market power that decreased only with the entry of new firms.spa
dc.identifierhttps://investigadores.uandes.cl/en/publications/0dffbabd-b815-461a-b77c-a6937baf59d0
dc.languageeng
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.sourcevol.56 (2020) date: 2020-05-01 nr.3 p.535-556
dc.subjectAntitrust
dc.subjectBrewing industry
dc.subjectMarket power
dc.subjectMerger review
dc.subjectAntitrust
dc.subjectBrewing industry
dc.subjectMarket power
dc.subjectMerger review
dc.titleMarket Power Absent Merger Review: Brewing in Perúeng
dc.typeArticleeng
dc.typeArtículospa
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